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The following reflections
io
ns
arou nd three. central qu l
about the proposed definit 1. Is
such a definitio n of human •eath
(and human life) philosopl ally
satisfactory? What are the tkely
and/ or possible contribution such
a definitio n would make to rt · eth·
ical values of our society? vtight
the hoped for benefits be a< omp·
Mr. Webe r, an assistant pro- lished in any other way?
fessor of religious studies at Mercy
The Sanctity of Personal l ife
College in Detroit, proposes three
questions man must ask in orde r to
Right at the h eart of ma n: quesarrive ·at a definition of death. His tions in medical ethics today is the
exploration examines the ethical question of what constitutd life
context of the sanctity of personal that is really human. Rizzo a n.! Yon·
life.
der have posed a very important
thesis fo r our consideration':

I have felt for some time that
ethicists should be reluctant to get
involved in discussions of the clinical definition of death. The question of whether death has occurred
is one that demands medical, not
ethical, expertise.
Recent suggestions that the pa-

tient be declared dead when the
neocortex is dead (suc h as the proposal by Rizzo and Yonder) 1 are,
however, much more than just disc ussions of how to tell when death
has occurred. Suc h proposals are
advocating a revision of our definition (social and ethical as well as
clinical) of human death and , by
immediate implication, of human
life. What is at stake here concerns
all of us.
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With the death of the neoco rte x human
life is ended because the potent iality to
reflect conscio usly is eradicated in th!!
organism . 2
Whe n the essential prerequisite for
huma n consciousness no longer exists,
tha t is, when the neocortex is dead, then
heartbeat, breathing and refle xes should
not be regarded as signs of human life but
rather s igns of biological life which has
lost the o r_ganic wholeness that makes tt
human life a nd which is in the process of
dying o rgan by organ. 3
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Do we want to accept the notion
that human life can be truly e nded
even in the presence of spontaneous
heartbeat and breathing? If we do,
we ought to consider very carefully
what we are doing.

the quali t
sense disc

f life ethic in the fuJi

~d a bove.
T he di< ,sion surrounding the
now famv .::ase of the 43 severely
deformed !, fants allowed to die in
the special-ca re nursery also indicates
sonw thing of the sanctity of
To clarify the issues at stake in
personal
life ethic. In the New Engmedical ethics, two conflicting apland
Journal
of Medicine, the auproaches are sometimes compared,
thors
wrote:
the "sanc tity of life" ethic and the
"quality of life" ethic. The sanctity
Rega rding the infants, some contended
of life ethic holds, in essence, that
tha t individuals should have a right to die
each and every human life is intrinin some circumstances such as anence·
sically good; that, therefore, all
phaly. hydroa ne ncephaly. a nd some se·
ve rely defo rming and incapacitating con·
lives are of equal value; that it is
dit ions. Suc h very defective individuals
·always an improper attack upon
we re considered to have little or no hope
human dignity to terminate the
o f ac hieving meaningful " humanhood".5
life of someone because of the con~ition of that life. The quality of The suggestion is clear that "humanhfe ethic, on the oth er hand , puts hood" is not to be vio lated, but that
· the emphasis upon the type of life such humanhood is also not to be
being lived, not upo n the fact of equated with animal life of the
life. Some lives are o f more value human species.
than others; some lives sh o uld not
Implicit in many abortion disc us~ l~ved. When a certain quality of sions also is the arg ument or the
Ide ts no longer possible , the termi- assumption that much mo re than
nation of that life is acceptable. the fact that the fetus is living is
While such a distinction may necessary before such life need be
often be useful, the question at hand acknowledged to have the rights
indicates that the typo logy must be and the sanctity that are recognized
refined to include a third approach to adhere to human life. The think- one that might be called the ing, frequent in our society, that
"sanctity of pe rsonal life" ethic. abortio n is in many cases acceptable
while infanticide is totally repugnant
. The sanctity of p~rsonal life posireflects, I think , the sanctity of
tton may very well be m o re compersonal life unde rstanding in medimon than either the quality or the
cal
ethics.
sanctity of life approaches. In her

study of physician's attitudes toward
th~ treatment of the critically ill ,
Diana Crane found physicians much
less inclined to treat patients with
sev~re brain damage than other
~tents. 4 Yet there was no indicalion that these doctors accepted
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The essential differences between
the sanctity of life position and the
· sanctity of personal life position is
in the understanding o f what is
human life. The sanctity of life ethic
defends two propositio ns:
t . That human life is sacred by
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' very fact of its e xtstence ;
va lue does no t depend upo n
ce rtain conditio n or perfec•on o f that life.
2. T ha t , there fore , a ll hu man lives
are of equal value; some a re
not of more value than othe rs.
The sanctity of pe rsonal life e thic
accepts the second proposition but
not the first. The quality of life ethic,
o n the othe r ha nd. rejects both .
This distinguishing of three a pproaches in medical e thics may
provide fo r a useful context in
which to consider the pro posal tha t
human de ath be viewed as neocortical death. lt does little justice to
proponents of such a definition to
equate the ir views with those who,
in the qua lity of life tradition, can
defend such practices as direct e uthanasia. On the o ther hand, it
should be recognized that the proposal is not in co mple te agreeme nt
with the traditio nal sanc tity of life
position .
T o the question, can humanhood
ever be lacking in the presence of
spontaneous heartbeat and breathing, the prop onents o f the sanc tity
o f life and the propone nts o f the
sanctity of pe rsonal life ma ke different respo nses. Eve n though the
Rizzo-Yonde r proposal was care ful
to insist that human death has occ urred o'n ly whe n the physiological
prerequisite for human conscio usness has irrevocably ceased to function, it differs from the traditio nal
sanctity of life position by emphasizing the physiological basis fo r a
particular type of life, not the biological life itself of the human
spec ies.
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The increasingly commor
dency among ethic ists to acce t
the pe rsonal in their understa
of man may borde r on a d u
view of man's nature. There
doubt that man is a personal
and that when his a bility to li'
personal being is di minisht
a bility to be fully human is
is hed. But to suggest, as is
done, that when persona l
absent or nearly absent, "
talking about "mere biologic a
that has no huma n significanc
say that it is only the perso
me nsion (in traditional Ian
the soul of man) that rea lly c
T o distinguish "the highe r t
functions''? from the "veg
functions shared by other an t
a nd argue that it is only the f
that adheres to the essence (
appears to express a dualisti
o f man at the very time tha t
o f Christian theology is pridin
in overc oming the "Greek du
of medieval Cqristianity. It
be eve n mo re ironic for mel
which h as always ministered
needs of the body, to adopt
that see ms very close to d
that the animal nature of m.
any value .

en·
ate
ing
~tic

no
·ing
as a
his
n in·
ften
! is
are
fe"6
is to
I di·
age,
tnts.
man
ltive
als"8
· mer
man
view
nuch
itself
lism"
.ould
cine.
o the
view
nying
n has

Witho ut denying that th re is
muc h that is attrac tive and to be
supported in the personal em phasis·
in conte mpo rary thought, questions
should be raised about the tendency
to define man in such a way that his
animal nature is nearly excluded.
Paul Ramsey wrote:
Man is an embodied person in such .3
way that he is in important respects hiS
body. He is the body of his soul no leSS
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that he is the soul (mind , wi ll) of his body.
There are more wa'y s to violate a human
being , or to engage in self-vi olation. than
to coerce man's free will o r h is rational
consent. An individual's body ... belo ngs
to him, to his humanum, his personhood
and self-identity, in such a way that the
bodily life cannot be reduced to the class
of the animals over which Adam was
given u nlimited dominio n . T o suppose
so is bound to prove anti-human -sooner
than later.9

1t may be a mis ta ke to define
something in terms of its specific
difference alone. While man di ffers
from other animals in his ab ility to
reflect conscio usly, he also has very
much in commQn with the m. T he
human animal is a n a nima l and,
when animal life continues to be
prese nt, it would seem that hu man
life would also be present in some
sense.
This is not to deny that certain
capacities are more fully human
than others. It is to say, rather, that
even when the fullness o f huma nhood is absent, human life is still
present. James Nelson makes an
important distinc tio n be tween hu·
man life and personal life:
Human life, understood development·
ally, can exist in pre-personal forms (as in
the fetus), in personal fo rms (as in the
individual with the capac ity fo r con·
sciousness, etc.), and in p ost-personal
forms (as in the permanently comatose
patient). In all of these stages it is h uman
life and as such it deserves o ur profo und
respect and concern. Nevertheless, there
are occasions in which the competition
of values between lives makes choices
about life's quality imperative. 10

To say that human life exists a nd
should be respected even when
personal life is not present is no t to
solve all the ethical pro ble ms of
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modern
d icine and of contc n·
porary '
·ty. It is, though, to ~e.:·
fuse to
le the eth ical issues by
denying
.t human life exists. One
o f the !11
s t reasons why we should
go slo v.. ' accepting the definition
of ne o._, tlica l death as human death
is that tl may be trying to solve a
problem tn a n oblique way, th ro ugh
rede fining. Obviously, it makes no
sense to go on treating a patient
with c erebral incapacity if s uch a
person is dec lared dead. I wonder
if it wo uld not be better to di rectly
a ttack the question of when to treat
a nd when no t to treat the dying pa·
tient.
The Impact on Medical Ethics

On the more practical leve l, there
a re also a n umber of reasons for be·
ing reluctan t to endorse s uc h a defi·
nition of death . It may have an im·
portant and , perhaps , h ighly undesira ble imp act upon the attitudes of
ma ny in o ur society in regard to
importa nt ethical dilemmas . Th is
can be seen if we consider briefly
the quest ions of euthanasia , abor·
tion, a nd the treatme nt of the mentally retarde d.
I a m using the ter m eutha nasia
here to re fe r to the active interven·
tion of the huma n agent to br ing
a bout death , not to the cessation
o f attempts to prolong life . Perhaps
the most c h a racteristic de fe nse of
mercy killing as ethically acceptable
is the argume nt that a system of
e thics m ust be " humanistic or per·
sonalistic, i.e., . . . a value system
that puts huma nness and persona l
integrity above biological life and
functio n".11 In other words, the
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:

argum r in favor of euth an a~w suggests · t it may at times be necessa ry t .nflic t damage upo n the physical t.t mensio n of man in order to
show respect for his pe rsonality. The
pe rsonal and physical a re separa ble
and violation of the human pe rson
consists primarily o f violation of the
personal. "Biological life and function" are of only seconda ry importance; they are no t inviolable.
It wo uld seem that any defin ition
of death that sees death in the prese nce o f spontaneous breathing and
he artbeat canno t he lp but contribute to the de nial of the invio lability of the body, to the l-ean-do-wha t
-1 -want-~ith-my-body me ntality. T he
very fact tha t one can talk about
huma n death while bodily life can
be observed (I am not talking, o f
course, about "life" provided by the
respirator) suggests that bodily life
is not sacred or essential to the understanding of what is human. While
the support for neo co rtical death
is in no .way the equivalent o f supp ort fo r direct e utha nasia, it may
ve ry well be that in the large r context of socia l attitudes, the moveme nt toward suc h a definitio n will
give support to the euthanasia
movement.
While most of the ethical a rgume nts in defense of e uthanasia a nd
most of the proposals for legalizing
e uthanasia have been restricted to
voluntary e uthanasia, there is a n
unde rcurrent of suppo rt for involuntary euthanasia as well. At this
level, the argume nt goes something
like this: the capacity for pe rsonal
existence may be so diminished (as
in ~he case of severe ly retarded in-
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fants) tha t certain "p ersons" sl
not be considered hu·m an a nd .
the ir lives sho uld be mere
e nded. 12 The possible contrib
of a neocortical definition of '
to this understa ndi ng o~ mat
already been discussed.

ld
IS,

tly
n
th
1as

An ethical argume qt that is ed
to de fend both voluntary a nd
ol·
unta ry euthanasia is that there no
significant ethical d ifference between allowing someone to di1 nd
inte rvening to bring about hat
death. Although it is a little
ore
diffic ult to see the connecti01 Lhe
pro posed new definition of
Hh
may suppo rt this argument a ls•
n
ethical a pproach tha t denies ere
is a ny diffe rence in the means ~ed
in the achieving of a timely , ath
is a n a pproach that puts the pn ary
emphasis on motivation and < intended results a nd not on the ore
"objective" factors like the at uns
take n. It may very we ll be th, an
understanding of death tha t e n 1ha·
sizes the capacity for personal ,ub·
jective life will , in the deve lop ,1e nt
of a ttitudes, give support to '' prima rily subjective a pproach to e hies;
wha t counts is the subjective d1 11en·
sion .
It is not difficult to see ho\\ the
e mphasis on pe rsonal life as human
life is muc h mo re c ongenia l to the ·
proponents tha n to the oppo nents
of abortio n. Muc h of the abort ion
deba te revolves a round the question
of what constitutes human life. life
that has the right to be protected
fro m destruction. The discussion,
even the Supreme C ourt's January,
1973, decision, includes such lan·
guage as "persons in the whole
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sense" and "capa ble o f meaningful
life". Those who ·insist that biological life of human pa re nts is huma n
life may find it inc reasingly more
difficult to persuade p eople o f their
position if medic ine a dopts a definition that, in princip le, separates
human life from biological life.
One might also wonder how suc h
a definition of huma n death would
affect the treatme nt in our society
of the mentally reta rded . G ranted
that ther~ is a differe nce be tween
saying that human life is absent
when the physiological pre requisite
for consciousness has irrevocably
ceased to func tio n and saying tha t
someone with severely diminished
mental capacity is no t human , the
emphasis on the me ntal and the declaratio n of non-human hood despite
biological life m ay reinforce the
tendency to treat the retarded as
less human or less than human .
Joseph Fletcher h as suggested that
we might want to establish c riteria
for humanhood that wo uld exclude
those whose I.Q. score registers a t
lower than 20.13 I do not know if
Fletcher's pro p osal will r ece iv e
much acceptance in American soci~ty, but we canno t suppose that the
Identificatio n of human life with
personal life will have no impact on
the ways we trea t the mentally re!arded.
I reiterate that I am not equating
the neoco rtical definition o f death
With euthanasia o r the defe nse of
e~thanasia ; I am not equating it
WJth the view that the huma n fetus
is _not human; I am not equating it
WJth less than satisfactory care for
the mentally retarded . What I a m
suggesting is that the questions of
May, 1974

e uthana
the ret;
ethical
posed <
sidered

abortion , and care 'lf
J constitute the larg,-r
te xt in which the protition ought to be c on-

...,

The J1l\lposal must be considered
o n its own merits, of course. If the
proposal is based on a valid understanding of the nature of huma n
d eat h a nd if such a clinical definition would be most useful in solving
ethical dilemmas in medical practice, the n it would probably be worth
taking the chance that it might make
an unfavorab le contribution to the
larger e thical context. I have already
suggested, however, that this partic ular understanding of death is
questio nable. I wonder also if it is
the best solution to the ethical dilemma.
Tbe Dying Patie nt

As was ind icated earlier, the presumed me rit of such a definitio n is
that it provides for a definite determination of whe n to cease treatme nt. That may, in fact, be the me rit of testing for neocortical death;
evidence of neocortical death probably should be taken as evidence
that the person "is in the process of
dying organ by organ".l 4 Note that
the emphasis he re is on dying rather
tha n on death ; evidence of neocortical death should perhaps be taken
as evide nce that the person is dying ,
not that he is already dead. This is
facing t_he ethical dilemma head-on,
for the real question is when to
cease treating the dying.
A s Paul Ramsey has indicated so
we ll, we should not treat the dy ing
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It an certainly be said that ou r d ut ies

to the dying differ radically from our
duues to the living or to the pot ent ially
still living. Just as it would be negligence
to the sick to treat the m as if they were
about to die, so it would be another sort
of "negligence" to treat the dying as if
they are going to get well or might get
well. The right medical prac tice will provide those who may get well with the
assistance they need a nd it will provide
those who are dying with the care and
assistance they need in their final passage.
T o fail to distinguish between these two
sorts of medical prac tice wou ld be to fail
to act in accord with the facts ... It would
be to act witho ut responsivity to th ose
who have no longer any responsivity or
~ec uperative powers.l 5

It would seem that the best medical care might be for the physician
- who is the o nly one who can do
it - to make the determination that
this dying process has begun. Then
proper treatment should become
care for the dying, no t struggle
against death. Not all means must
be used to prolong life; in fact, last
days o r ho urs filled with tubes and
a grim losing battle against death
might very well constitute "negligence" to the patient.
The determinatio n that the neocortex is "dead" may be o ne of the
ways of knowing that the time has
come to treat this patient as dying
and not as someone to be saved from
dying. Thus the notion of neocortical death can function as the proponents want it to, as a determination that treatment should end. It
can function this way without the
diffic~lties associated with defining
death as personal death.
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It is no t easy , for the ph y ~
o r fo r the family , to decide to "
all treatment when it has been
mined that the dying proces
begun. In some ways, it would
ably be easier to declare the p
dead than to "allow him to d i
the lo ng run , though, it may
more benefit to medicine and
e ty to go slowly. In the light 1
wider ethical context discus!>
these pages, we should reco
that the change involved in tt
definition of death is a much g ·,
departure from ·t raditio nally a l
ed medical practice than the c h
involved in the practice of
attempting to prevent the l
fro m dying.
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In summary, and with refe 1 nee
to the three questions with \' ic h
this paper began, this autho r \\ uld
urge caution in adopting a ne
>rtical definition of death. U nles~ further clarification indicates tha the
biological is not being undervc. ued
as a component of human lifL the
definition may be philosoph t a lly
unconvincing. The definitio r . it
would appear, would likely le a d to
the strengthening of ethical attitudes in o ur society that some of us
would consider questionable o r
worse. And it is possible that the
desired benefits could be ac c o mplished without such a definition.
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